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BOOK REVIEWS
PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MÊME CHOSE
TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P� O’Hara� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015� 384 pages� $49�95� 
In the literary mountain of scholarship, 
research, and writing devoted to World 
War II, the story of Operation TORCH, 
the Allied landings in North Africa in 
November of 1942, is presented often as 
something of an overture to the massive 
amphibious symphonies that followed� 
Accounts may include some discussion 
of Eisenhower’s growing facility for 
strategic leadership, the byzantine nature 
of Vichy and Free French politics, and 
the gradual emergence of Charles de 
Gaulle as the leader of Free France� The 
landings themselves all too often have 
been presented as hinting of a Kabuki 
production, if not of opéra bouffe, with 
a few desultory shots fired to assuage 
Gallic honor, followed by capitulation� 
Then, it seems, the real war begins, 
moving down dusty roads to Kasserine, 
the initial blooding of the U�S� Army, 
the rise of Patton and Bradley, and the 
inexorable sweep of operations to Sicily, 
the Italian mainland, and eventually the 
beaches and hedgerows of Normandy�
Vincent O’Hara has done much to 
correct this impression and to give 
TORCH the attention it deserves� 
Readers will come away with a much 
better understanding of the difficulties 
faced by both the French defenders and 
the Allied invaders and the political 
currents that swirled about the operation 
from the very beginning—and with 
an appreciation for how the results 
could have been very different�
As O’Hara points out, 1942 was a 
parlous time for the Allies� Axis 
armies were cutting deep into the 
Soviet Union, and fear that it would 
drop out of the war was palpable� U�S� 
leaders, particularly George Marshall, 
eschewed what might be considered 
military sideshows and argued for a 
rapid buildup of force in Great Britain, 
followed by a cross-channel invasion 
at the earliest opportunity� The British, 
led by Churchill and scarred by their 
experience in World War I, preferred 
less direct approaches, avoiding the U�S�-
favored direct attack until victory was 
assured� TORCH represented a victory 
for British planners and a setback for 
Marshall� This is among the better-
known elements of the North African 
campaign, and O’Hara does it justice 
without dwelling overlong on the topic�
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BOOK REVIEWS
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TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P� O’Hara� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015� 384 pages� $49�95�
In contrast, French politics usually 
are, for the most part, underexamined, 
and O’Hara provides a valuable 
understanding of French actors and 
motives� His examination of Marshal 
Pétain’s efforts to end the German 
occupation and restore France to 
something approaching its former status 
is both convincing and useful� So too 
is O’Hara’s meticulous description of 
French forces, plans, and readiness in 
North Africa on the eve of invasion�
O’Hara’s discussion of invasion 
planning and preparation and the 
movement to the various landing 
beaches is excellent� Although dwarfed 
by later invasions, TORCH required 
a major effort at a time when Allied 
amphibious resources were extremely 
limited� Scheduling convoys, arranging 
for carrier-based air support, and 
coping with potentially lethal surf 
conditions all foreshadowed difficulties 
that would have to be overcome in later 
amphibious operations� The plan was 
audacious� Allied forces were to carry 
out five simultaneous and geographi-
cally separated landings on the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean shores of North 
Africa, then race to Tunis to trap 
German forces in Africa and deny those 
forces additional support from Europe� 
Accomplishing this would bring the 
Mediterranean under much greater Al-
lied control, and the Axis might have to 
take some pressure off the Soviet Union 
to deal with the new threat to the south�
As O’Hara makes clear, French 
resistance, while affected by conflict-
ing orders on whether to take Allied 
troops under fire, was not a token 
effort, although the loss of only 1,700 
Allied wounded and killed may have 
contributed to this impression� Although 
ill equipped and often outnumbered, 
French forces, including colonial auxil-
iaries and units of the Foreign Legion, 
fought well� While some French units 
offered no resistance, they did so in obe-
dience to orders from their command-
ers� O’Hara details the action on each 
of the five invasion beaches in detail�
The naval battle of Casablanca was, as 
O’Hara describes it, “the largest surface, 
air, and subsurface naval action fought 
in the Atlantic Ocean during World War 
II�” The battle, which lasted six hours, 
featured naval gunfire duels between 
USS Massachusetts and the disabled 
French battleship Jean Bart. French 
shore batteries engaged U�S� warships 
and French combatants shelled Allied 
landing craft en route to the invasion 
beaches� French officers handled their 
ships with courage and daring, and they 
came close to engaging the Allied troop 
transports� Maps are provided, greatly 
aiding the reader’s understanding of 
how the battle was conducted� There 
was also a naval engagement off Oran, 
and Italian and German aircraft and 
submarines conducted significant 
antishipping actions as the campaign 
wore on� O’Hara illustrates that, far 
from being an Allied walkover, the 
possibility of TORCH resulting in a 
disaster at sea was much more likely 
than is normally acknowledged�
A greater appreciation of TORCH by 
students of amphibious warfare is war-
ranted� Many of the problems associated 
with projecting power from the sea were 
identified during this campaign� The 
role of beachmasters, the timing and 
coordination of shore bombardment, 
and the logistical difficulties associ-
ated with landing supplies on an open 
beach in high surf all were factors� At 
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times the lessons learned were small, 
such as the discovery that landing net 
rungs spaced too far apart posed a 
significant danger to debarking troops�
Some elements of the TORCH landings 
touch on current questions� For example, 
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe 
raids had demonstrated previously the 
inherent difficulty in conducting an 
amphibious assault on built-up areas, 
TORCH would feature several efforts 
along these lines� The most dramatic of 
these was an attempt to land U�S� troops 
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland 
(the former U�S� Coast Guard cutters 
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively) 
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor� 
Both vessels quickly were identified as 
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of 
French fire until sunk� In contrast, an 
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a 
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five 
specially trained assault troops, six miles 
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway 
to carry out an attack on a critically im-
portant all-weather airfield� The effort, 
despite experiencing significant delays, 
succeeded� In an ever-urbanizing world, 
the viability of direct amphibious as-
saults may be open to debate once again�
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH, 
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for 
results� It would take five months to 
achieve victory in North Africa, not the 
three weeks anticipated� The operation 
did nothing to ease the plight of the 
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean 
remained contested waters� The African 
campaign drew men, matériel, and 
shipping away from efforts to support 
a direct invasion of Europe� TORCH 
resulted in the total occupation of 
France by Germany and the intentional 
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon� 
None of these results, according to 
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and 
Germany� However, in the opportunity 
to identify and resolve amphibious 
challenges and as a beginning to the 
development of a truly combined 
strategic command, TORCH was of 
value� If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also 
ensured that France would not become 
a true ally of Germany, the strategic 
benefit may have been significant�
TORCH sheds some welcome light on 
a campaign that too often is passed 
over� Scholars and lay readers alike will 
find the book useful� While O’Hara 
has performed yeoman service in 
providing this detailed account of the 
amphibious portion of the campaign, 
perhaps his greatest contribution 
is to restore the reputation of naval 
forces that, far from offering token 
resistance, fought with courage and 
tenacity, often against superior odds�
RICHARD J� NORTON
How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Al-
lied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson 
O’Brien� Cambridge, U�K�: Cambridge Univ� 
Press, 2015� 640 pages� $35�
This book provides a detailed reexami-
nation of the main contributory factors 
leading to Allied victory in World War 
II� In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists� During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union� That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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War by revisionist historians who 
placed an increased emphasis on the 
role of Soviet ground and air forces in 
the defeat of Germany. The Russian 
front, it was argued, was where the 
bulk of Germany’s forces was engaged 
and, as far as the revisionist narrative 
went, defeated by the Soviet Union. Dr. 
O’Brien, a reader at the University of 
Glasgow, challenges that argument with 
a wealth of data and looks at the war in 
more global terms. He argues that the air 
and sea forces of the United States and 
the British Empire played the decisive 
role by preventing “the Germans and 
Japanese from moving” (p. 16).
How the War Was Won provides a broad 
array of detailed information discussing 
the enormous industrial contribution 
of all sides. Indeed, the author’s analysis 
of all this information makes a compel-
ling case for his argument. Yet there is 
something missing: it is difficult to see 
the link between cause and effect. One 
can see such a link better regarding the 
war against Japan, but in the case of the 
war in Europe the author does not show 
clearly the link he claims between air 
and sea power causing immense damage 
to Germany’s war economy and Soviet 
troops wandering around Berlin in 1945. 
I suspect that the Soviet forces’ killing 
and wounding of millions of German 
combat troops might have something to 
do with this, for without the physical re-
moval of German soldiers from the Sovi-
et Union’s route to Berlin Hitler might 
not have felt the need to commit suicide.
Now, there is no denying that Allied 
air and sea power contributed to Allied 
victory in Europe; the argument seems 
to be to what extent they did so. Thus, 
this book is welcome for the depth of 
detail it provides as fodder for such a 
debate. That this reviewer is not entirely 
convinced of the author’s arguments 
does not make this a bad book; it is in 
fact a very good book, and an extremely 
welcome addition to the literature on 
World War II. It provides an enormous 
amount of information and analysis 
about the role of air and sea power, 
which furthers our understanding of 
the reasons for Allied success. That it 
causes the questioning of the current 
orthodoxy is to be applauded, as 
greater understanding often results 
from challenges to the status quo.
This book should prove of great benefit 
to advanced students of World War 
II, and it is particularly pertinent for 
specialists interested in current U.S. 
national security needs. Given the 
friction that exists among the United 
States, China, and Russia, the book 
provides an opportunity to think about 
how the U.S. armed services should 
structure their forces for any future 
conflict with these potential adversaries. 
Dr. O’Brien’s book should be read by 
any sailor, marine, or airman invested 
in a budget fight, because “the only way 
to ‘win’ a war is to stop your enemy 
from moving” (p. 488). That argument 
seems a particularly pertinent one when 
looking at the problems of Southeast 
Asia or the Baltic or Black Sea regions.
NICHOLAS MURRAY
A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the 
Samurai to the 21st Century, by John T. Kuehn. 
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014. 299 pages. $75.
Japan is at an inflection point. Depend-
ing on how particular peoples and 
nations view this enigmatic country, it 
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now either is turning away from rightly 
enforced demilitarization and back 
toward the more martial and expansion-
ist policies of its past, or is working to 
become a security provider concomitant 
with its economic power� A Military 
History of Japan is therefore a timely 
work that will add studied moderation 
and critical analysis to the argument 
regarding the path on which the country 
is located now and down which it 
is likely to progress in the future�
This book goes well beyond a traditional 
historical narrative� The author fol-
lows Japan from its origin myths up 
to the present time, adding elements 
of geographic determinism and 
cultural anthropology as well as his own 
experiences� The military and warfare 
aspects obviously receive the most 
focus, but they are not, and perhaps 
cannot be, separated from the overall 
history of the country and culture�
In the first chapter, “From Sun Goddess 
to Samurai,” the author helps explain 
Japan’s nature by telling its creation story 
and examining how landscape, climate, 
outside influences, and internal competi-
tion shaped Japanese development and 
societal worldview� Around the eighth 
century CE, when that first chapter con-
cludes, the seminal samurai culture, and 
an overall Japanese culture distinct from 
those of neighboring Korea and China, 
is in place, one the author argues still 
manifests itself in Japanese society�
The following chapters chronicle the 
subsequent maturation of Japan’s 
political and military power structure� 
The many accounts of royal machina-
tions and specific battles may confuse 
or lose those not well versed in Japanese 
geography or language, but those the 
author includes do add to the story of 
how and why Japan’s military evolved as 
it did� These middle chapters also shed 
light on the Japanese military’s actions 
during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and on the still-tense relationship 
between Japan and its neighbors, much 
of that distrust predating World War II� 
The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese 
Wars get ample attention and analysis, 
as does the very calculated, top-down 
manner in which Japan’s post-samurai 
military attempted to imitate the best 
militaries of contemporary Europe�
The “Great East Asian War” chapter 
may not cover much new ground for 
those readers with more-than-standard 
knowledge of World War II� But in 
“After the Samurai,” the book’s final 
pages tie in themes present in Japan 
for at least 1,200 years� They provide 
an excellent argument that Japan’s 
future will be determined by the same 
geographic, cultural, and geostrategic 
influences that have shaped its past�
The author is a retired naval aviator and 
a professor at the Army Command and 
General Staff College� He spent time 
living in Japan both as a dependent 
child in the mid-twentieth century and 
later as a Navy officer� These experi-
ences give him insights different from 
those expected from either a pure 
academic analyst or a strategist viewing 
the country simply as an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier� He effectively inter-
sperses personal and family recollections 
with more-standard history to give 
better descriptions of cultural norms 
and practices, as when he writes about 
Japanese rioters sending teams ahead 
to warn citizens, including his parents, 
to stay indoors for their own safety�
For the casual reader, A Military History 
of Japan functions as a needed update 
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to Ruth Benedict’s much-maligned 
yet still-influential 1946 work The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, a 
general primer on the seemingly 
contradictory forces driving this global 
power� For those with a professional 
interest in the country and its region, 
this book is a must-read, an enlightening 
facilitator in the current debate over 
Japan’s place in Asia and the world�
 J� OVERTON
Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, by 
George Friedman� New York: Doubleday, 2015� 
288 pages� $28�95� 
Flash Points is both an elegant and a 
disturbing book� Not simply elegant 
in its writing style, which is direct and 
clear, but also in its initial discussion of 
the age of discovery and enlightenment 
that propelled the European nations 
into becoming world powers—you 
rarely find a more cogent and concise 
explanation of the roots of European 
social, cultural, political, and economic 
development� Yet the book is also very 
disturbing because it details how the 
factors that allowed Europe to transform 
the world—faith, individualism, scien-
tific inquiry, ideas of self-determination 
and legal rights, and nationalism—also 
contributed to the almost unfathomable 
destruction of the two world wars that 
tore it apart� George Friedman details 
the region’s history, current events, and 
potential future in a way that makes 
an admonishment from his father, a 
Hungarian Jewish survivor of both the 
Nazis and the Soviets, seem very true: 
“Europe will never change� It will just 
act as if nothing happened” (p� 23)�
Freidman, the well-known founder of 
Stratfor�com, one of the first private 
intelligence firms to be a major pres-
ence on the web, and an author of 
prescient books on the future security 
environment, begins with the personal 
history of how and why his fam-
ily escaped Hungary in 1949� Having 
survived the horrors of World War 
II and the Communist takeover in a 
weak, dependent, and occupied nation, 
Friedman’s father wanted his family 
to go to America and “live in a strong 
country with weak neighbors and, if 
possible, no Nazis, communists, or 
anyone else who believed in anything 
deeply enough to want to kill him 
and his family over it” (p� 17)� His 
view—that a humane peace in Europe 
always would be a mere interlude—sets 
the scenario for the rest of the book�
This fear is, of course, what spurred the 
creation of the European Union (EU)� 
Friedman analyzes the weaknesses 
of the EU and the sources of conflict 
throughout Europe, particularly in a 
situation in which NATO’s perceived 
importance has diminished, and 
concludes that the centripetal forces of 
geopolitics are just too strong� It is not 
just the potential collapse of the euro; it 
is the fact that national identities cannot 
be supplanted by a European identity 
without destroying a cultural diversity 
established over millennia� The fact that 
the EU appeared to achieve some small 
success in cultivating a cosmopolitan 
Europeanness is, in Friedman’s view, 
merely a veneer that a U�S� commitment 
to defending a cold peace under unique 
historical circumstances made possible�
Those circumstances have devolved� 
With the controlling pressures 
removed, Yugoslavia—perhaps the 
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greatest attempt at fusing otherwise 
hostile nationalities—exploded into 
violence until all sides were exhausted 
by fighting or concluded that opposing 
NATO’s wishes was too costly� But that 
was before a resurgent Russia could 
intervene on behalf of the Serbs� Fried-
man’s book tours the other potential 
flash points of Europe within a back-
ground where Russia is back, and the 
geopolitical question of who will be the 
hegemonic leader of Europe—France, 
Germany, or Russia—has returned� It 
is not ambition that drives; it is fear of 
the power of the others (as Thucydides 
described so many centuries ago)� By 
all measures, Germany would remain 
the dominant power in economics, as 
it is the economic engine of the EU 
today� But it also is the power most 
easily invaded from both east and west� 
And it is growing impatient with the 
seeming impossibility of creating an EU 
that conforms to its view of necessary 
order� The Germans, according to 
Friedman, view themselves as the 
victims of the EU/euro economic 
crisis� What would it mean to the EU, 
NATO, and specifically eastern Europe 
if Germany were to cut a deal with 
Russia to secure its own “permanent” 
peace—secure to be the export 
power it already is beyond Europe?
In Friedman’s view, the question of 
Germany, Russia, and European peace 
is one of national culture as well as 
geopolitics: “For the Germans, success 
and disaster are intimately linked, so 
they are simultaneously afraid of what 
they have achieved and tremendously 
proud of it� � � � They do not aspire 
to lead a new Europe� They fear that 
they cannot escape the role� The rest 
of Europe harbors suspicions that 
Germany’s public fears and modesty are 
feigned, that in the end the old Germany 
has never died but has merely been 
asleep” (p� 153)� Add in Russian pressure 
and the fact that post–Cold War 
Germany is united, and the European 
foundation seems a lot less stable�
Even if the European powers never 
are moved to conflict with each other, 
Friedman’s conclusion is that the situ-
ation can make the continent safe for 
ethnic breakups, with all the resulting 
potential for wars—or perhaps hybrid 
wars and gray-zone conflicts—to 
occur� Russia will be the first to take 
advantage of that, prompting others to 
do the same� He predicts that “Europe’s 
history of conflict is far from over� � � � 
[I]n many places Europe’s anger against
other Europeans is still there” (p� 251)�
Ultimately, Friedman sees the future still 
controlled by Europe’s “Faustian spirit” 
that “haunted its greatest moment, the 
Enlightenment,” defined as “the desire 
to possess everything even at the cost of 
their souls,” and today “everything at no 
cost” (p� 257)� By “everything,” he means 
national sovereignty without the exercise 
of national sovereignty; wealth distribu-
tion without work distribution; a world 
in which they can feel like the hegemon 
but not have to be it; a world in which 
wars would stop without interven-
tion; and, perhaps worst of all, ethnic 
nationalism without its implications�
What can be done to prevent growing 
conflicts? Friedman flirts with the fact 
that America today is still as powerful 
as it was when it put out “the European 
fire in 1918 and 1945” and contained 
it during the Cold War� But can it do 
so in the future? Should it do so in the 
future, or do the fires need to burn 
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themselves out? Friedman is not sure, 
but he does give us a disturbing prospect 
about which we need to think deeply�
SAM J� TANGREDI
The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, 
and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region, 
by Michael R� Auslin� New Haven, CT: Yale Univ� 
Press, 2017� 304 pages� $30�
The signature foreign policy move, 
and greatest strategic insight, of Barack 
Obama’s presidency was “the pivot”—
later renamed “the rebalance”—to the 
Asia-Pacific region� President Obama’s 
initiative grew out of his conviction that 
Asia had become the most important 
region in terms of economic dynamism, 
explosive demographic growth, and 
growing military tensions� And if one 
broadens the geography and semantics 
to include India—yielding the “Indo-
Pacific”—this makes utter sense, since 
the region claims 60 percent of the 
world’s population, nearly 40 percent of 
total global economic output, some of 
the fastest-growing and most capable 
militaries, and three nuclear states� No 
surprise, then, that the Obama White 
House argued in a November 2015 fact 
sheet that this region “is increasingly the 
world’s political and economic center of 
gravity�” Or, as top Asia expert and dip-
lomat Kurt M� Campbell astutely wrote 
in The Pivot: The Future of American 
Statecraft in Asia, “[T]he lion’s share of 
the history of the twenty-first century 
will be written in Asia” (pp� 1, 344)�
While the Obama administration 
made a compelling case for the logic 
of pivoting to Asia—that is, elevating 
the time, attention, and resources 
given to the region relative to other 
parts of the world—the results were 
uneven� Washington reinvigorated its 
diplomacy in the region, strengthened 
commitments with U�S� treaty allies, 
forged relationships with new partners 
such as Burma, began shifting military 
assets to the region, and negotiated 
a far-reaching trade deal intended to 
deepen economic integration� But it also 
failed to ratify that trade deal, suffered 
significant political setbacks with treaty 
allies Thailand and the Philippines, 
was unable to counter Pyongyang’s 
rush toward acquiring nuclear weapons 
capable of reaching the United States, 
and did little to restrain Chinese 
maritime assertiveness and economic 
and political coercion in the region�
How then should one understand and 
evaluate the myriad factors contributing 
to Asia’s future? And are the risks to 
the continued growth and stability of 
the region now eclipsing the region’s 
promise? These are the questions that 
Michael Auslin, scholar in residence 
at the American Enterprise Institute, 
asks in his judicious, sobering, and 
compelling new book The End of the 
Asian Century� Auslin argues that Asia’s 
future is significantly less assured than 
is commonly held� As a longtime scholar 
of, frequent traveler to, and trenchant 
observer on the geopolitics of Asia, he 
is positioned well to make such a case� 
This book is far from a polemic; in 
fact, Auslin approaches these questions 
as a skeptic, describing how he in fact 
originally held the opposite belief—that 
the twenty-first century inevitably 
looked to be an Asian century� Yet 
through repeated trips to the region and 
multiple meetings with senior policy 
makers, businessmen, and military 
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officers, he became convinced that risk 
rather than opportunity was the most 
salient feature of the Asian political, 
economic, and military landscape� He 
argues that U�S� policy makers have been 
overly optimistic about opportunities in 
the region and insufficiently attentive to 
risks, thereby warping U�S� perception of 
regional trends and causing the United 
States to pursue misguided policies�
This book is Auslin’s attempt to intro-
duce a framework to assess risks in Asia 
properly, across five major categories� 
These include threats to Asia’s growth 
from the end of its economic miracle 
and the failure to implement structural 
macroeconomic reforms; demographic 
pressures that will place increasing strain 
on rapidly modernizing and urban-
izing political and economic systems; 
unfinished political revolutions that will 
address these large-scale economic and 
social dislocations; long-term historical 
antagonism among various Asian states, 
the lack of effective regional political 
community among them, and the dearth 
of effective institutions to mitigate crises; 
and, most alarming, the growth of power 
politics and the increasing potential for 
war� The book’s organization follows 
these categories, with chapters mapping 
risk in each thematic domain� A final 
chapter both summarizes and concludes 
with a series of policy recommendations�
Auslin posits that as risk increases, 
prudent investors take out more insur-
ance� This advice is as relevant to nations 
as to individual investors, and applies 
across all the categories of risk contained 
in the earlier sections of the book� In the 
security realm, he argues for a concen-
tric triangular approach, with an inner 
core of states—Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Singapore—working 
closely with an outer core of the region’s 
liberal-democratic heavyweights, 
Australia, India, and Japan, to counter 
an increasingly aggressive China� 
Economically, he advocates for struc-
tural reforms within Asian nations and 
trade liberalization among them� To 
alleviate political instability, he pushes a 
realistic democracy-promotion program� 
To avoid isolating China, he promotes 
an agenda for enhancing contact with 
ordinary Chinese citizens� Linking all 
these recommendations is a belief that 
long-term stability in Asia is most likely 
to flow from increased liberalization and 
democratization, and that the United 
States should have an indispensable 
role as partner and catalyst in that 
process� Absent American involvement, 
investment, and leadership, short- and 
long-term instability are likely to rise�
Auslin issues the caveat that his book is 
not intended as a comprehensive guide 
to all the countries in the region or all 
the issues affecting them� And yet in just 
222 pages his book manages to serve 
not only as an excellent introduction 
to the region but as an incisive guide to 
understanding the contemporary risks 
roiling the most consequential region of 
the world� Extremely useful for national 
security professionals, investors, and 
interested observers alike, this book 
moves beyond headline news to analysis 
and advice in navigating the region’s 
shifting geopolitical, demographic, and 
economic landscape� Some will find 
his recommendations too aggressive, 
although his policy prescriptions explore 
both costs and benefits� Others perhaps 
will allege that Auslin is too bearish, too 
gloomy on what many are expecting to 
be the dawn of the Asian century� But, 
given the acceleration of tensions in 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   154 4/21/17   8:35 AM
9
Bratton et al.: Book Reviews
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 5 5
Asia, the demise of trade liberalization, 
the erosion of democracy and advance 
of autocratic rulers, and the doubts 
the Trump administration has cast on 
its commitment to alliances, we may 
find that he was in fact too sanguine�
CHARLES EDEL
Warring Navies: India-Pakistan; Indian Navy’s 
Role in the Indo-Pak Wars, by Ranji Rai and Jo-
seph Chacko� Dombivli West, India: Frontier In-
dia Technology, 2014� 320 pages� $20�
Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko’s book, 
Warring Navies, is a welcome addition 
to the scant coverage of the naval 
history of South Asia� The authors are 
a retired Indian navy commodore and 
a defense journalist, respectively, and 
the book draws heavily on Commodore 
Rai’s experiences in the navy� The book 
itself crosses the boundaries between 
memoirs and popular history, covering 
the history of the Indian navy’s opera-
tions from independence through the 
end of the Cold War� It also includes 
several stand-alone essays on various 
topics related to maritime and regional 
security by prominent retired Indian 
military leaders, such as former army 
chief Ved P� Malik, former navy chief 
Vishnu Bhagwat, and Lieutenant 
General C� Satish Nambiar� One of 
the major strengths of the book is its 
coverage of the many lesser-known uses 
of the Indian navy (e�g�, the liberation 
of Goa in 1961 and the interventions 
in the Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri 
Lanka in the 1980s)� It is particularly 
useful for both Indian and non-Indian 
readers to be aware of these past actions 
today, as both India and its international 
partners debate India’s role as a security 
provider in the Indian Ocean region�
The book is pitched toward a general 
audience interested in military and 
naval affairs in South Asia� The prose is 
engaging and humorous, which makes 
the book a quick read� For example, 
the title for the chapter on the 1965 
war—in which the Indian navy was not 
particularly active—is “The Navy Does 
Sweet Fanny Adams in 1965�” One of the 
more interesting aspects of this book is 
its use of various Indian, Pakistani, and 
American autobiographies and memoirs 
to interject vignettes from people 
involved in the conflicts, ranging from 
Indian naval officers to Pakistani leaders 
and even to Henry Kissinger� These 
provide insight into the perspectives of 
participants in the events� The book’s 
main strength is that it gives an insider’s 
view on the challenges of joint opera-
tions for the Indian military� There are 
some excellent examples, ranging from 
air force and naval aviation in the 1965 
war to amphibious operations in 1971 
and smaller operations in the 1980s�
A couple of minor points detract from 
the book� Given that it is a popular 
history based on personal observations 
and the memoirs of participants, some 
of the general history of the conflicts 
does reflect older interpretations and 
narratives that are now debatable� The 
book is not academically sourced and 
does not have citations, so the reader is 
left wondering whether the book would 
have been improved if the authors had 
engaged more with the work of recent 
historians, such as Srinath Raghavan’s 
excellent work on the 1971 war, or  
even the classic histories of the Indian 
navy done by Admirals Singh and  
Hiranandani� Similarly, the book could 
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have given greater attention to format-
ting and editing to improve its structure 
and eliminate typographical errors that 
distract the reader� In particular, the 
intersection of long quotations from 
other authors sometimes confuses the 
narrative; perhaps some of these longer 
passages could have been placed in an 
appendix so the authors’ narrative would 
not be interrupted� Last, some of the 
additional essays by other authors do not 
seem to fit within the theme of the book�
However, these shortcomings need to be 
taken in context, given the nature of the 
book and its intended audience� Readers 
should keep in mind that the work 
is intended to be neither a definitive 
history nor an academic book, so they 
should not expect it to engage with the 
academic literature or offer extensive 
footnoting� But for its intended audience 
and modest ambitions, it does succeed 
in bringing a valuable perspective with a 
great deal of personal experience to the 
reader in an approachable and readable 
format� It will be of use to readers who 
want more anecdotal details of the 
history of naval operations and the naval 
cultures of India and Pakistan, and those 
who want a short overview of the naval 
aspects of the conflicts in question�
PATRICK BRATTON
Vietnam Narratives and the Collective Memory 
of the Vietnam War, by John A� Wood, War and 
Society in North America series� Athens: Ohio 
Univ� Press, 2016� 200 pages� $69�95�
More than forty years after the last U�S� 
combat troops departed Vietnam in 
1973, the conflict looms large in Ameri-
can popular culture and memory� Vivid 
depictions of guerrilla warfare, antiwar 
protests, and psychologically troubled 
veterans proliferate in print and film� 
This was not always the case, however� 
Silence followed in the immediate af-
termath of the Vietnam War as veterans 
and civilians alike grappled to forge 
meaning from the long, costly interven-
tion and ultimate American defeat� The 
arrival of veteran-authored memoirs in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s reignited 
popular interest in the war and inspired 
numerous others to follow suit� In sub-
sequent decades, the gritty authenticity 
of these best-selling narratives, written 
by “those who were there,” profoundly 
shaped American collective memory 
and historical discourses about the war� 
John A� Wood’s Vietnam Narratives and 
the Collective Memory of the Vietnam 
War aims to expose myriad misconcep-
tions that have developed as a result�
Undertaking a comprehensive analysis 
of the best-known Vietnam veteran 
memoirs, Wood delineates the accura-
cies, omissions, and miscues inherent 
in the genre to ascertain its overall 
influence on American understanding of 
the war� His methodology centers on the 
collective analysis of fifty-eight Vietnam 
veteran memoirs and oral histories 
published between 1967 and 2005� He 
supplements this primary set of texts 
with films, newspapers, U�S� government 
studies, historical scholarship, and 
personal accounts from Vietnamese 
civilians, African Americans, women 
veterans, and other less prominent 
authors� Wood’s primary argument 
is that veteran narratives are subject 
to the properties and limitations of 
memory� Based on personal recollection 
usually written long after the events in 
question, memoirs necessarily provide 
a fragmentary and biased perspective�
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Seven chapters ranging in topic from 
author demographics to race, sex, 
and postwar life illustrate this point� 
Examining the backgrounds of the most 
prominent authors, chapter 1 generates 
a demographic profile for the typical 
Vietnam-veteran memoirist: a college-
educated, white, male officer� Although 
enlisted personnel tended to be younger 
and more-diverse working-class men, 
Wood astutely notes that most veteran-
writers were low-ranking officers whose 
combat experiences were not only simi-
lar to but representative of those of the 
men they commanded� Chapter 2 delves 
into the authorial ambivalence common 
to many veteran narratives, which 
simultaneously disparage the military 
mission and condemn Vietnamese civil-
ians as duplicitous enemy collaborators 
and greedy opportunists� Wood attempts 
to rehabilitate popular perception of the 
Vietnamese by justifying their behaviors 
as the desperate actions of the inhabi-
tants of a war-ravaged nation� Observing 
a conspicuous absence of racial tensions 
in the best-known Vietnam memoirs, 
chapter 3 foregrounds the narratives 
of nonwhite veterans as a race-centric 
“countermemory” of the Vietnam War� 
Wood’s analysis reveals two competing 
paradigms: authors either highlight ra-
cial cooperation and pride in the combat 
performance of their particular ethnic 
groups or they underscore incidents of 
white racism and express a separatist 
racial ideology derived from the Black 
Power movement� Women and sexual-
ity are the focus of chapter 4, which 
concedes that male soldiers generally 
behaved in a sexist manner in their 
interactions with Asian and American 
women in Vietnam� Wood attributes the 
prevailing misogynist attitude of Ameri-
can servicemen to mainstream and 
military cultures that emphasized sex 
and promoted a general hostility toward 
women� Chapter 5 debunks prevailing 
myths about veterans’ homecomings 
and postwar lives: first, that Vietnam 
veterans suffered from post-traumatic 
stress disorder at a greater rate than 
soldiers who survived earlier wars; 
second, that Vietnam veterans literally 
were spat on by an ungrateful American 
public on their return home� Chapter 
6 underscores the ambivalent political 
sentiment common to Vietnam vet-
eran memoirs and concludes that such 
characterizations accurately reflected 
the views expressed in U�S� government 
opinion polls� The final chapter tracks 
numerous similarities between Vietnam 
memoirs and narratives produced 
by veterans of other American wars, 
arguing that cross narrative parallels 
reflect a consistent demographic among 
authors as well as the fact that “combat 
soldiers’ wartime experiences have not 
changed in many fundamental ways 
since at least the 1940s” (p� 109)�
Wood’s desire to present a comprehen-
sive analysis of the genre has produced a 
volume that is both more superficial and 
more repetitive than necessary� Wood 
also overlooks the ways that memoirs 
as a genre guide veterans’ selection of 
stories to include� Memories are at once 
distilled to a carefully curated collection, 
embellished with expository detail and 
context, and stitched together to form 
a compelling narrative arc� Vietnam 
veteran narratives not only inspired 
and made acceptable “uncensored” 
accounts but provided a model and 
template for the types of stories that 
should be featured� Noncombatant 
veteran memoirs, for example, represent 
a potentially rich, untapped vein of 
information for scholars but almost 
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certainly lack the high-intensity combat 
usually considered “worthy” of retelling�
Although Wood’s research is volumi-
nous, it relies heavily on published 
materials� Archival records and 
Vietnamese-language sources would 
strengthen an already insightful analysis 
of American veteran narratives and 
their imprint on popular perception 
of the war� Moreover, Wood’s reliance 
on previous scholars’ works undercuts 
his oft-repeated claim that the book 
offers an overdue corrective to exist-
ing scholarship� Indeed, this slender 
volume is directed not only to the casual 
reader but to the professional historian� 
According to Wood, Vietnam veteran 
memoirs have received “inadequate 
treatment” by literary scholars and 
historians, who generally consider only a 
small sample of texts and fail to distin-
guish fiction from nonfiction narratives� 
He further charges that few military 
historians scrutinize veteran-authored 
texts� Yet Wood’s fundamental premise 
that this book “is a work of history, but 
it does not treat veteran memoirs as 
sources that can be straightforwardly 
mined for information” belies a naive 
understanding of professional historical 
practice (p� 5)� Any responsible scholar 
approaches her sources—archival and 
secondary—with a professionally  
critical eye�
Even so, this book would be an excellent 
addition to an undergraduate military 
history curriculum� Wood’s clear and 
impressive synthesis of historical and 
literary scholarship provides a useful 
introduction to the critical study of 
Vietnam veteran memoirs� Interested 
readers will want to supplement Wood’s 
book with fine-grain examinations such 
as David Kieran’s Forever Vietnam: How 
a Divisive War Changed American Public 
Memory, Thomas Myers’s Walking Point: 
American Narratives of Vietnam, and 
Jerry Lembcke’s The Spitting Image:  
Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of  
Vietnam�
BREANNE ROBERTSON
The Role of the Royal Navy in South America, 
1920–1970, by Jon Wise� London: Bloomsbury, 
2014� 288 pages� $122�
Although arguably not a very enticing 
title for American naval professionals, 
this small, hardback book is nonetheless 
well worth their time� The author’s aim 
is to illustrate the contribution that the 
maritime service can make to a nation’s 
foreign policy in peacetime, and in 
particular to the health of its shipbuild-
ing and defense exports� While the 
book obviously showcases the fortunes 
of twentieth-century Great Britain, the 
points it makes are broadly transferable 
and increasingly relevant in this era of 
growing emphasis on seamless inter-
governmental cooperation� Besides, the 
subject matter is refreshing: How often 
among naval monographs do you find 
a top-notch scholarly investigation into 
that most mundane and yet ubiquitous 
naval mission of “presence” or “show-
ing the flag”? Naval officers are quick 
to extol the virtues of these activities 
in conversation, but few actually can 
substantiate their claims� This book 
goes some way toward filling that gap�
The book has its origins in a PhD disser-
tation on the history of the relationship 
between the Royal Navy and its Chilean 
counterpart� As such it limits the focus 
to a manageable analysis of the presence 
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mission in a particular theater at a given 
time, while at the same time allowing a 
useful extension into the broader topic 
of naval diplomacy throughout the 
Americas as a backdrop� The work be-
gins with a survey of the extant scholar-
ship on showing the flag—a term that the 
author explains is really too broad to be 
useful—before moving chronologically 
through the decades of the last century� 
By and large the chapters flow logically 
into one another, although the compara-
tive chapter on U�S� postwar defense 
plans (chapter 6) seems something of an 
outlier, particularly in view of the title� 
The research is excellent and uses a wide 
variety of contemporary official sources 
and established scholarly works� The 
author is an academic researcher and 
does not appear to have had any naval 
experience, although he has done his 
homework in gathering the appropriate 
naval opinions� The work forms a 
concise and usable package� (However, 
from a publishing point of view, the 
physical ink used in the printing leaves 
a lot to be desired� In the reviewer’s 
copy, even the action of fingering a page 
lifted the print right off the paper!)
The book’s overall message is that, while 
the Royal Navy was suffering through a 
stretch of undeniable decline throughout 
the period, even in its heyday the 
service never really enjoyed a position 
of complete, influential dominance 
on the South American continent� 
Furthermore, by being proactive and 
focusing its efforts on areas where 
success was more likely, it managed to 
maintain a surprising level of influence 
for far longer than one might have 
imagined in what was, after all, very 
much a secondary theater for the 
United Kingdom� To this end, the book 
showcases the importance of the attaché 
in linking naval and diplomatic efforts, 
as well as the enormous value of offering 
educational experiences and exchanges 
to foreign officers, thereby sowing the 
seed corn for future cooperation�
Interestingly, it also demonstrates that 
even in the absence of such schemes, 
the Royal Navy leadership could and 
did lead the impetus for change, with 
surprising success—as evidenced by the 
impact of the 1970s “Group Operating” 
concept, which enhanced the prestige 
value of the navy’s visits ashore while at 
the same time sustaining its skills and 
capabilities at sea� The navy benefited in 
that its “blue-water” skills were pre-
served far longer than would have 
been possible otherwise, and defense 
sales benefited from the showcasing 
of those skills� It truly was a “win-win” 
development� In conclusion, this is a 
worthwhile read for anyone interested 
in the broad topic of naval diplomacy 
overseas or defense sales in particular�
ANGUS ROSS
The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary 
Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetrical, by Pauline 
M� Kaurin� Surrey, U�K�: Ashgate, 2014� 154 pages�
$149�95�
Pauline Kaurin is associate professor 
of philosophy at Pacific Lutheran 
University, specializing in the just war 
tradition and military ethics� For this 
volume, Kaurin developed her research 
during time at the U�S� Naval Academy 
and U�S� Military Academy and in 
dialogue with academic colleagues in 
the International Society for Military 
Ethics� This volume examines the ethical 
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complexities facing the modern warrior 
engaged in asymmetrical warfare (AW)�
In the introduction, Kaurin begins 
with a thorough discussion of the term 
warrior, giving it a meaning distinct 
from soldier, sailor, airman, or any other 
military operator� To give meaning to 
the warrior concept, Kaurin reaches 
back to ancient Greek mythology: she 
finds Achilles, of Homer’s Iliad, to be 
the “touchstone” for the ethical warrior� 
Kaurin does not see Achilles as the per-
fect example of a warrior; instead, Achil-
les exemplifies the military professional’s 
existential essence in war and personifies 
warrior virtues, resilience, and prowess�
Even though Achilles fought his wars 
in antiquity, Kaurin sees Achilles as 
relevant to the AW of the current era� 
Examined through the lens of jus in 
bello, how do we fight like Achilles and 
how do we fight against Achilles? The 
volume addresses the moral education 
of the warrior to engage and interpret 
better the unconventional conflicts 
that present ethical challenges, as 
well as ethical impediments that are 
contrary to jus in bello� How do we 
equip the warrior to engage ethi-
cally complex weapons technology and 
changing asymmetrical conflict?
Kaurin argues for a systematic examina-
tion of the ethical challenges posed by 
autonomous weapons and AW� What are 
the ethics of the strategies and tactics 
of each of the two sides in AW? One 
side may use torture against captives, 
whether combatants or noncombatants, 
while the other side chooses not to 
reciprocate owing to countervailing 
moral norms, contrary public opinion, 
and lack of political will� How does 
the warrior question, think, and 
respond to such moral dichotomies 
faced in AW? Kaurin’s premise is that 
moral education must address AW 
within the scope of jus in bello�
The focus on AW stems from two 
points� The first is a mind-set fixed 
on a conventional-war theory that 
understands asymmetrical conflict as 
part of conventional warfare� A second 
point is that AW requires new challenges 
to ethical thinking that are counter 
to that associated with conventional 
war� When will serious ethical thought 
be given to the changing nature of 
war, which confronts the norms of 
traditional war between nations?
Kaurin’s thoughts and observations 
go beyond AW� She identifies the 
deeper nuances of moral asymmetry, 
as defined by Michael Gross and Rob 
Thorton� The adversary’s failure to 
practice reciprocity undermines the 
moral norms, strategy, and tactics of 
the generally stronger opponent� With 
disproportional impact, the effect 
represents a symbolic and ideological 
stance against the stronger opponent�
Of the ethical questions Kaurin 
poses throughout the book, some are 
being contemplated already, while 
others are harder to engage because 
the moral scope involved cannot be 
brought into focus yet� She contends 
that understanding the full scope of the 
ethical issues requires getting into the 
hearts and minds of the adversary; yet 
often it is the adversary who artfully 
gets into the hearts and minds, and 
the social fabric, of the opponent�
Kaurin contends that if warriors are to 
engage in asymmetrical moral conflict, 
they must have courage� Yet the techno-
logical development of weapons means 
that the physical distance between 
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opponents is growing, so it takes less 
courage to go to war� Achilles had the 
courage to fight face-to-face, taking  
risks and facing danger directly�  
For many, distancing oneself from 
danger—even the risk of danger—by 
using technology imposes a fundamental 
weakness on the modern warrior amid 
the challenges he faces� Kaurin presents 
a detailed analysis of courage in an 
asymmetrical context, with a prescrip-
tion for developing courageous warriors�
Another moral attribute that Kaurin 
sees as essential to the warrior ethos is 
loyalty� This loyalty is built on leader-
ship and trust and is a foundation of 
the profession of arms� Referencing 
the Illiad, she compares the loyalty of 
Achilles, the traditional warrior, with 
that of Hector, the contemporary, 
professional warrior� A strategy for 
training warriors for loyalty is laid 
out� In addition to excellent military 
ethics literature references, Kaurin uses 
film to illustrate key ethical points�
The combatant/noncombatant 
distinction must be made clear for the 
soldier considering jus in bello� Kaurin 
proposes a five-level gradation of power 
and threat, from highest to lowest:
• uniformed combat personnel
• unconventional belligerents
• those provisionally hostile
• neutral or nonhostile noncombatants
• vulnerable noncombatants
Discerning the appropriate category
of combatant/noncombatant would
determine the appropriate level of force�
Such a moral model of ascertaining
the threat level would equip the soldier
better in the ethics of jus in bello.
Kaurin’s thoughts are a contribution 
to the literature on the higher level of 
moral thinking for military leaders� She 
does not shy away from the conundrums 
the warrior faces� To maintain an 
ethical edge in asymmetrical warfare, 
military ethics must be embedded into 
the culture of the profession of arms�
THOMAS E� CREELY
The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Tru-
man at the Brink of Nuclear War, by H� W� Brands� 
New York: Doubleday, 2016� 448 pages� $30�
The relief of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur by President Harry 
S� Truman remains one of the most
controversial and debated wartime
command decisions made in the
military history of the United States�
By April 1951, Douglas MacArthur was
at the peak of his game as a military
leader� His public pressing to widen the
war in Korea, in direct contradiction
to the intent of his president, and his
public statements to that end that led
to his dismissal still fuel debate today�
H� W� Brands gives depth to the tale of 
MacArthur versus Truman by includ-
ing the complexities that existed in 
the Korean conflict and its Cold War 
context, when a U�S�-led “free world” 
was engaged in a global struggle against 
Soviet-led Communism (and especially 
Soviet interest in Central Europe)� As 
the fighting in Korea continued, official 
Washington, and the Pentagon in 
particular, worried that the war effort 
was tying down more and more U�S� 
military resources—worries that 
fueled further concerns that Moscow 
might see the United States stretched 
militarily and unable to defend 
Central Europe adequately�
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   161 4/21/17   8:35 AM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/11
1 6 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Brands highlights another lesser-known 
aspect of the Korean War: MacArthur’s 
desire to bring Chinese Nationalist 
forces into the fight� Truman and the 
Joint Chiefs, knowing how this could 
antagonize Mao’s China and possibly 
widen the war, did not view the idea 
favorably� Truman and the Joint Chiefs 
were not convinced that Chiang 
Kai-shek’s corrupt and recently defeated 
forces would prove more of an advantage 
than a burden to the fight in Korea� 
MacArthur also clearly chafed at what 
he perceived to be Truman’s hesitancy 
in fighting Communism� Truman, in 
turn, remained focused on the Com-
munist threat to Central Europe and 
U�S� commitments to its European allies, 
all the while trying to balance resisting 
Communist aggression in Korea against 
preventing the conflict from widening�
Yet the conflict in Korea did widen 
when Chinese forces entered the fray 
in November 1950—an escalation 
that caught MacArthur off guard� 
Only a month earlier, in his famous 
meeting with Truman at Wake 
Island, he categorically had dismissed 
Chinese intervention as a concern�
The central element of the MacArthur-
Truman controversy proved to be the 
persona of Douglas MacArthur himself� 
Having lived and fought in the Pacific 
since 1937 (and not having returned to 
the United States until his relief in 1951), 
MacArthur had a self-described faith in 
his understanding of the “Asian mind�” 
By 1951 MacArthur, then seventy-one, 
had lost touch with his country, which 
had changed considerably in the thirteen 
years since he had been there last� Be-
lieving he could speak for the American 
people, MacArthur allowed a draft effort 
to go forward for the 1952 Republican 
presidential nomination� Yet, not 
desiring to campaign and growing ever 
more shrill in his speeches, MacArthur 
quickly doomed his potential candidacy 
to oblivion� His seeming advocacy for 
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea 
gave civilian and military leaders further 
pause, particularly when he suggested 
“sowing of fields of suitable radio-active 
material” in theater� Interestingly, it 
was President-elect Eisenhower who 
later broke the peace talk deadlock 
by intimating his openness to using 
nuclear weapons against the Chinese�
Perhaps the most damning part of 
the MacArthur story is the general’s 
testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations Com-
mittees upon his relief of command 
and forced return from Japan� The 
testimony, which Brands recounts in 
great detail, makes for some of the best 
reading� MacArthur tries to live up to 
his reputation, yet appears to be out of 
his league before inquisitive senators� 
He ultimately loses what support he 
had from Republicans, who, while no 
fans of Truman, in the end opted not 
to cast their lots with MacArthur�
A few aspects of the book did prove 
distracting� Detailed maps of the 
Korean Peninsula showing the many 
stages of the Korean War would have 
added to the reader’s understanding of 
the conflict but are absent� Further, a 
glitch in binding resulted in the Korean 
Peninsula map that was included on the 
inside cover being upside down� The 
reviewer contacted the publisher via 
e-mail and, although acknowledged,
was not responded to� And on page
329 the author’s passage “MacArthur’s
prediction that by January 1950 the
victory would be so complete” is clearly
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a misprint, because North Korea did not 
invade South Korea until June 1950�
These items are minor and easily 
corrected in a future edition� What 
remains still is a powerful book that 
goes into great detail, benefiting 
from the storytelling ability of H� W� 
Brands� We hope that a civil-military 
conflict between a towering figure like 
MacArthur and a sitting U�S� president 
is unlikely to reoccur� Yet the story 
remains a valid one today, with its les-
sons on the reach of military power in 
a democracy, the role of the president 
in setting national policy, and the role 
of civilian oversight of military power�
DAVID L� TESKA
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why 
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael 
W� Myers� Lawrence: Univ� Press of Kansas, 2015� 
208 pages� $34�95�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
is “an exercise in the elucidation of 
terms”—an exercise necessary to 
determine whether the Empire of 
Japan could have avoided defeat at the 
hands of the United States and its allies� 
The focus on “terms” is important, 
as precision and clarity are vital to 
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to 
challenge the near-universal acceptance 
of the idea that Japanese defeat was 
inevitable� On the contrary, Myers 
argues that there were several points 
in the war where the arc of history was 
subject to change, given a different mix 
of luck, skill, will, or strategy� Myers’s 
book takes aim at British historian H� 
P� Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
assertion that since “the defeat of 
Japan was assured” no single battle or 
campaign can be considered “decisive�” 
The Pacific War and Contingent 
Victory challenges this conventional 
view that inherent industrial, financial, 
and demographic shortcomings all 
but guaranteed Japanese defeat�
Myers is also careful to argue that, 
while the Japanese could have avoided 
defeat, this does not mean necessarily 
that they ultimately could have gained 
victory� Rather, Japan might have 
realized outcomes short of actual defeat, 
such as an armistice preserving some 
of the gains made early in the war, a 
return to the status quo ante bellum, or 
even a negotiated surrender that left 
Japan more intact than it would be when 
it ultimately did surrender in 1945�
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the 
rest of the proponents of inevitable 
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence 
on precise terms: as he explains, all that 
is required is to show that there was the 
slightest chance of a Japanese victory, 
however long the odds or improbable 
the required chain of events� If, even 
under the most remote of conditions, 
a different outcome could have oc-
curred, then the inevitability argument 
is defeated� Myers then argues that if 
defeat was not a certainty, then one 
or more events—be they battles or 
campaigns or just a moment of good 
or ill fortune—had to be decisive� It is 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to 
argue with Myers’s logic� His position 
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer 
defending the owners of a carnival who 
offer a commonly found midway game 
involving tossing softballs into milk cans 
for prizes� All the lawyer has to do is 
show that it is possible for the softball to 
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go into the can, even if the likelihood of 
that happening is as close to zero as one 
can get, and no one ever wins a prize�
Myers produces ample evidence to prove 
his point� He notes that even Willmott 
himself acknowledges that a German 
victory in Europe could have enabled 
Japan to achieve something other than 
defeat in the Pacific� If the avatar of 
inevitability admits the possibility of 
an alternative outcome, what else is 
needed to carry the argument? However, 
the clarification that Japanese defeat 
was nearly inevitable versus simply 
inevitable is a distinction without a 
difference� If this were all there was to 
Myers’s book, it would be scant reward 
for the cost of purchase or the time 
spent reading it� Luckily there is more�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
identifies a number of ways by which 
Japan might have avoided defeat� 
These include a United States willing 
to settle for a negotiated conclusion 
in the face of mounting casualties 
and war weariness� Greater success 
against Australia, which Myers argues 
could have been achieved, perhaps 
combined with a successful invasion 
and occupation of Hawaii, might have 
been another means to a different end�
In sum, Myers’s book—which has 
been used in the Naval War College’s 
curricular case on the Pacific theater 
in the Second World War—by focusing 
on war’s contingent nature, illustrates 
well the oft-noted maxim that in war 
the enemy truly does “get a vote�”
RICHARD J� NORTON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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